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REPORT

Number 25-July 1978

The Homestead Property Tax Relief Act
And The. State Budgetary Process
by
William C. Barlet*

Introduction
On January 5, 1977, in accordance with Article 6, Section
9 of the Constitution of Montana, Governor Thomas L.
Judge transmitted to the 45th legislative assembly the 197779 biennial executive budget recommendations for state
government. The governor unveiled what he termed "a
taxpayer's budget, pared to a bare minimum, yet adequately
addressing the problems facing Montana during the
upcoming biennium."
The proposed executive budget called for record
expenditures of $1.9 billion of state and federal funds in the
1977-79 biennium. The governor advised members of the
legislature that the proposed all-funds biennium budget of
$1.87 billion would be 15 percent larger than the 1975-77
budget of $1.63 billion without being inflationary. Governor
Judge estimated that federal funds would provide about
$500 million of the 1977-79 budget, or slightly more than
one-fourth of the governmental expenditures he wanted the
legislators to approve. Judge said his budget, if accepted,
would halt the growth of state government and actually
reduce the number of state employees, while necessitating no
personal tax increases in the two years of the biennium. The
general-fund portion of the executive budget-the
anticipated cash revenue which the legislature must officially
allocate, in accordance with Section 79-415, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947- amounted to $448.6 million. Thus, the
executive budget proposed a 26 percent increase in the
general-fund portion. The governor attributed the increase
to the direct allocation of general-fund monies for the
property tax relief initiative approved by the Montana
electorate in the November 2, 1976 general election, and for
the elimination of the statewide permissive levy for public
schools. The executive stated that, excluding those two
direct allocations, the general-fund operating budget for the
new biennium would be only 12 percent higher than for the
*William C. Barlet received an M.A. Degree from the University of
Montana. in 1977 and an M.P.A. Degree in 1978. Currently he serves as a
job analyst with the Personnel Division, Montana Department of
Administration.

1975-77 biennium. The governor concluded that the
proposed executive budget provided $61.4 million in direct
property tax relief.
Thomas Judge had emphasized the need for,property tax
relief in his successful campaign for a second term as
Montana's governor, and the Homestead Relief Act became
almost a running mate for the governor during the
campaign. On the eve of the 45th session, the governor
termed the Homestead Relief Act, and the plan to fund it
with a general fund surplus, an expression of the people's
desire for property tax relief. The "State Funded Homestead
Tax Relief Act," Initiative 72, had been backed by a decisive
popular vote the November before. The initiative carried
every Montana county; 71 percent of qualified electors
voting indicated their approval and 204,532 persons favored
the proposal. Governor Judge contended that no longer
could the Homestead Relief Act be called his proposal, since
the measure had received that 71 percent majority. He
insisted that the message embodied in the results of the
election must be interpreted as a mandate from the people,
and he directed the legislature on the eve of the session to
consider that popular expression.

I

THE LEGISLATURE ACTS

As the 45th Montana Legislature began deliberations, the
governor spelled out what he wanted in terms of property tax
relief legislation in his State of the State address. He pointed
out that although Montana ranked 40th among the 50 states
in all taxes collected per capita, the state ranked 6th in
property taxes levied per capita. Judge said state
government only receives less than 5 percent of property tax
revenues, but it is the state's responsibility to insure that
ability to pay is maintained as the prevailing principle of
equitable taxation among all political jurisdictions within its
boundaries. The governor contended that the property tax
conflicted with that principle. He maintained in his State of
the State address that if the legislature accepted his proposed
budget, including $31.8 million to eliminate the statewide
permissive levy for public schools, with over half that
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amount coming from the state's federal revenue-sharing
funds, there would be no statewide property taxes for
support of public schools in Montana during the two years
of the biennium. The governor then called upon the
legislature to appropriate $3.5 million from state income tax
surcharge revenues for sharing with local governments
which might be hurt by property tax limitations. This
property tax relief plan had constituted Thomas Judge's
number one campaign pledge, and he offered the Homestead
Relief Act as the beginning of permanent property tax relief
in Montana (adding that every biennial legislature would
have to continue to provide .funding to keep the program
going). The governor stated that this means of relief would
begin to redress the imbalance facing residential property
owners who have been held disproportionately responsible
for support of Montana school systems and local
governments.

Since Article 3, Section 4 of the Montana constitution
specifies that the people may not enact laws by initiative for
appropriations of money, and Article 9, Section 14 specifies
only the legislature may appropriate moneys, the
Homestead Relief Act merely provided that "to the extent
funds are provided by the legislature" property tax relief
would be forthcoming. In effect, this meant that should the
legislature have refused to appropriate funds for this
purpose, neither the governor nor state taxpayers would
have had any legal recourse to obtain state funds.
Although they had no legal recourse, supporters of the
initiative could pursue avenues of political recourse. To
avoid the legislature's refusal to fund the measure,
proponents brought numerous pressures to bear upon
legislators balking at the proposal or entertaining hopes for
alternative measures. Governor Thomas Judge, an
aggressive defender of the relief proposal, served as a catalyst
for those pressures.

Therefore, the 1977 Montana Legislature opened with
property tax revision as one of the key points on its agenda.
To proponents of the Homestead Relief Act, the measure's
impressive victory at the polls meant that the 45th
Legislature was obligated to appropriate the needed funds.
However, the governor's contention that the Homestead
Relief Act's funding should be in the "legislative bag"
because the people had registered their approval of the
measure created legislative waves.

The substantive criticisms began when the legislature's
chief fiscal analyst stated that the governor's 1977-79 budget
would not provide any overall net property tax relief. The
fiscal analyst made his property tax observations in an
analysis of the executive budget, in accordance with section
43-1114, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. The analysis
represented the first comprehensive review of an·executive
budget in Montana. In 1975, the legislature established the
fiscal analyst's position as a means to provide a review of the
executive budget. Legislators believed an independent
analysis would allow the legislature to examine a range of
fiscal policy options that previously had not been available.
The legislature initiated the review process not as a means to
criticize the recommendations of the executive, but as a
means to "present alternative recommendations when
meaningful alternatives are clearly available." The role of the
fiscal analyst quite often could be an irritant to the governor.

Thomas Judge had previously backed two property tax
relief measures in the legislature; SB 312 in 1974, and SB 11
in 1975. The Montana Senate rejected both, with SB 312
going down by a roll call vote of 36-5 and SB 11 losing 48-0.
In the fall of 1976, the governor made the decision to conduct
an initiative campaign (under provisions of Article 3,
Section 4 of the Montana constitution). Governor Judge
directed the formation of the initiative committee, the
Citizens For Property Tax Relief, and on January 2, 1976,
the campaign began to secure the 15,938 signatures of
registered voters needed on petitions proposing statutory
changes in Montana. Although Governor Judge did not
participate directly in the initiative campaign in an official
capacity, he informally coordinated the committee's efforts
to secure citizen support. The campaign produced 16,251
signatures by the deadline date, three months before the date
of the election, and Initiative 72 officially became part of the
November 2nd ballot.

The analysis of Governor Judge's proposals by the analyst
provided the legislature with alternative interpretations
concerning the state's role in property tax relief. The analysis
of the governor's tax relief plan began:
The executive budget purports to contain $61.4 million in direct
property tax relief over the biennium. We believe there is no net
property tax relief in the budget.

The ballot submitted to the qualified electors of Montana
included title and text of the initiative, with the following
words:

The fiscal analyst argued that the governor's proposed state
aid to public schools would be so low that property taxes
which support local schools would have to be raised by $30
million statewide. The fiscal analyst contended that that
figure would almost exactly offset the $29.6 million the
governor had included for the reduction of statewide
property taxes on owner-occupied homes. He recommended
that the legislature increase public school support by $30
million above what the governor had recommended, adding
that only then would the $29.6 million Homestead Relief Act
that the governor supported and the Montana voters had
approved be real tax relief. The fiscal analyst said his own
recommended level of state public school support would

For reduction of owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied
residential property.
Against reduction of owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied
residential property.

Voters approved the initiative and the State Funded
Homestead Tax Relief Act became law. However, the
initiative did not, by itself, reduce property taxes on each
owner-occupied home. Initiative 72 did not place an
affirmative duty on the legislature to fund the proposal.
2

repudiate the overwhelming mandate of the electorate for property tax
relief.

allow total school spending to increase about 7.25 percent
annually, while holding taxes on existing real property
constant. The governor contended that his proposal would
allow a 6 percent increase in total public school spending.
The fiscal analyst maintained that the cost increases assumed
in the executive calculation would entail increasing the
average voted school property tax levy 10 mills by the end of
the biennium, and that the governor's budget staff
overestimated the availability of other revenue which could
be used for schools.

The governor cautioned the legislature that he would veto
any spending measure that would reduce money available
for the property tax measure, any attempt to repeal it, and
any increase of more than 6.3 percent in the state foundation
program for support of public schools. Governor Judge
closed his mid-session budget message with the warning:

The director of the Office of Budget and Program
Planning, who is in charge of preparing the governor's
proposed budget, answered the fiscal analyst by contending
the executive budget did, in fact, contain the $61.4 million in
direct property tax relief. The director maintained that the
fiscal analyst had mistakenly calculated that school budgets
would grow by 7.25 percent annually, since the analyst had
not taken into account what the director said would be a
decline in enrollment during the biennium. The director also
called the fiscal analyst's 7.25 percent figure "inflationary,"
nothing that Congress had projected an inflation rate of only
4.8 percent and the Consumer Price Index had been
projected to rise only 5.5 percent in 1977.

I continue to maintain full confidence in Montana's ability to provide
adequate service levels for citizens, to provide full funding of the
property tax relief law enacted by the people, and to maintain a $12.5
million surplus as a cushion against unforeseen fluctuations in the
economy. I will, as I have indicated in the State of the State message
and this letter, resist with the full constitutional power of this office,
legislative actions which counteract attainment of those goals.

As legislators digested the executive's message, the
governor scheduled visits around the state to discuss the
Homestead Relief Act and its progress through the session.
These visits prompted charges from some sectors that the
trips constituted political junkets. The governor repeatedly
said throughout the state: " ... I am amazed and shocked
that there are legislators who are reluctant to support the
measure after it was carried by an absolute overwhelming
margin by the people."

One major problem of the relief plan recognized by
proponents and criticized by opponents concerned the lack
of tax relief provided by the measure for renters or others
who do not own the homes they occupy-a number
estimated by opponents of the measure as comprising onethird of Montana's population. To address that specific
criticism of the plan, supporters promised that renters would
not be overlooked in the relief. In a pamphlet provided by
the Secretary of State's office, Voter Information for
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Referendums, and
Initiatives, which included voter information for the
November 2, 1976 election, the Citizens for Property Tax
Relief promised that renters would be aided. The rebuttal to
the argument advocating rejection of the measure stated:
" .. . legislation to provide relief to renters is being prepared
for introduction in the 45th legislative assembly and would,
if enacted, become effective at the same time as Initiative 72."
However, except for the Property Tax Replacement Act,
which the governor opposed and is discussed below, no one
introduced legislation during the 45th legislative assembly to
provide property tax relief to renters.

Therefore, as the session progressed, the governor again
made it clear to the legislature and Montana citizens that he
expected the plan to be funded-and funded intact. The
governor promised to use his constitutional prerogatives
should his executive proposals be endangered by revision or
alternative spending. And he continued to make it known to
the legislature that any attempt to revise or deny funding
would be interpreted as a blatant disregard of the people's
wishes. The governor, in effect, admonished legislators that
failure to fund the Homestead Relief Act would be
tantamount to snubbing the democratic initiative process,
and that he, in his role as executive, would be pointing out
that fact to each and every Montana voter.
At one point during the session, the governor advised
legislators that they should increase state income taxes if
state revenues would not be sufficient to fund his tax plan.
The governor commented to the press that if the money
would not be available from any other source, he would
support an income tax increase because he believed that
Montanans would prefer an income tax increase if they
could realize some property tax relief. Governor Judge made
this comment after being advised by a group of legislators
that the large number of revenue bills that had been filed
during the session and the governor's own fiscal projections
for the public school funding program jeopardized the
funding of the Homestead Relief Act. Legislators believed
that the public would tend to view an income tax increase as
the responsibility of the legislature, while property tax relief
would be credited to the governor. Thus, the alternatives
available to legislators appeared to be: (1) sacrifice their own
bill preferences and fund the Homestead Relief Act; (2) fund

To deal with this unorganized array of opposition, the
governor resumed his high-profile strategy and countered
with the strengths inherent in his executive role. The
governor, as is his constitutional prerogative (Article 6,
Section 9 of the Montana Constitution), issued a midsession budget message to the legislature. In the message, the
governor brandished his veto power. He stated that he would
not tolerate any legislative tinkering with his Homeowner's
Property Tax Relief Act, nor would he allow a deficit
budget. The governor addressed the legislature:
Politics is the art of compromise . . . however, this governor will not
compromise the state of Montana into a general-fund deficit, or
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their pet bills and the Homestead Relief Act, thereby
necessitating more state revenue, probably in the form of
increased income taxes; or, (3) refuse to fund the Homestead
Relief Act.

opinions at the committee's hearing. Supporters of the tax
replacement plan also contended that these representatives
violated another law because they .had not registered as
lobbyists in accordance with Section 43-803 of the Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947. The objections concerned the
testimony of five members of the Montana Department of
Revenue at the April 7 hearing. Proponents of the Property
Tax Replacement Act contended that the governor had
"badgered" them in order to defeat the tax replacement
measure and secure funding for the Homestead Relief Act.
The committee chairman's ruling that the committee had
issued an invitation to department spokesmen erased any
question of illegality concerning their testimony. Yet the
author of the Property Tax Replacement Act commented on
record that he had never seen a bill so lobbied by a governor..

As the Homestead Relief Act continued to draw flak for
substantive reasons, the alternatives available to legislators
created no shortage of political skirmishes. As the deadline
for transmittal of the bill from the House to the Senate
approached, both Republican and Democratic legislators
leveled charges at the governor. Legislators accused the
governor of attempting to enter the legislative branch
through the "back door" with the Homestead Relief Act and
forcing the lawmakers into a political corner on the issue.
As the transmittal deadline drew closer, House
Democrats, who held a 57-43 majority, continued to be
strongly split over the Homestead Relief Act. On April 6, a
straight party-line vote in the House forced a delay on the
relief plan vote. The intent of the delay was to give House
Democrats time to work out their differences over the
measure in the privacy of the caucus. Opposition among
Democrats ranged along the lines of criticisms discussed
above. Yet the legislators could not ignore the governor's
pressure nor the fact that the plan had been backed by over
200,000 Montanans. Republicans, on the other hand, argued
that the governor's proposal be considered as quickly as
possible and, some said, killed if possible. Yet it seemed
doubtful that House Republicans would hold the line
against funding the measure; a majority of their constituents
had probably voted for the measure, since the initiative
carried every county in the state. Some Republican
legislators weighed the thought of embarrassing the
Democratic governor by joining Democratic dissidents.

Although nothing illegal did in fact occur, the opposition
to HB 3 by the Department of Revenue consisted of well
organized presentations and comprehensive coverage. The
department's incoming director acknowledged that the
testimony represented unique participation by the
department:
It is our normal custom to testify in an informal manner and as
succinctly as possible, for the purpose of conserving your time. Because
of the complexities and far reaching implications of this bill, we are
with the Chair's indulgence, altering our usual format.

In any event, the Revenue Department's testimony did not
cause HB 3 to be defeated in the powerful Senate Taxation
Committee. It passed by a 6-4 vote. The measure had earlier
passed the House by an overwhelming 67-28 bipartisan vote
despite the governor's repeated warnings that he would veto
the measure should it be approved. The Property Tax
Replacement Act eventually went down to defeat in the
Senate by a vote of 29-18.

Despite substantive opposition and frustration emanating
from the governor's aggressive tactics, the Democratic
majority in the Montana House of Representatives reversed
its position on the Homestead Relief Act on April 8. With
the Democrats muting their opposition, and with
Republican help, the Homestead Relief Act received funding
for at least the first year of the 1977-79 biennium. The
measure cleared the House on a vote of 71-29. Democratic
floor leaders secured support by exerting pressure and
proposing an amendment to the funding measure. The
House amended the funding measure, HB 838, on the floor
to insure that tax relief for a second year would not drain the
general-fund below $6 million. The amendment also
stipulated that the plan not operate for the 1978 tax year if
the general-fund falls below $15 million.
The House sent both the Homestead Relief Act and the
Property Tax Replacement Act (HB 3) to the Senate for
deliberation, but the replacement plan met with opposition
in the smaller body. . During the
Senate Taxation
Committee's hearing on HB 3, proponents of the Property
Tax Replacement Act leveled charges at the executive
branch for violations of the separation of powers doctrine
(Article 3, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution). The
charges stemmed from the belief that the governor had sent
individuals from the executive branch to represent his

The Montana Senate approved funding for the
Homestead Relief Act on April 18 by a vote of 35-15.
Immediately following the vote, Governor Judge
commented:
Great news ... it has been a long battle-four years of work on our
part. It's a great victory for the more than 200,000 Montanans who
voted for it.

Opponents felt voters had been duped into voting for
illusory tax relief by a governor with further political
ambitions. Similarly, they felt that the governor acted in a
fiscally irresponsible manner because of his use of the
initiative campaign. Some termed the plan a political
gimmick to assure Thomas Judge's re-election to Montana's
highest office and contended that the overwhelming success
of Initiative 72 stemmed from the nature and timing of the
"selling" campaign waged by proponents. Opponents viewed
the governor's use of the initiative and public opinion as
overstepping the boundaries between the executive and
legislative branches of Montana state government. They said
the presence of the initiative on the 1976 ballot declared, in
4

inherent contradictions and how they affected the state
budgetary process. In the succeeding pages, the use of the
hybrid democratic system is analyzed, along with its
implications for the state budgetary process. The roles of the
actors in the 1977-79 biennial budgetary process, and the
actors' interpretations of those roles as affected by the hybrid
democratic system, are also examined. Constitutionally
prescribed roles are examined in the context of the political
pressures that emanated from the passage of Initiative 72.

effect: "We have a $50 million surplus up here in Helena,
wouldn't you like to have some of itT' Opponents
maintained that no voter would turn down an enticing deal
like that; even renters would not turn it down, since they had
been promised accompanying relief legislation.
Those who supported the Homestead Relief Act termed
the victory a success for Montana and the beginning of real
property tax relief. Supporters perceived every attempt to
defeat the measure as a legislative slap-in-the-face to the
citizens who voted yes on Initiative 72. But some legislators
who voted for the act felt backed into a corner fiscally and
politically.

Criticisms of the Homestead Relief Act are relevant to this
analysis in that they provide evidence that the legislature
made comparisons of alternatives and studied the relative
value of proposals. Furthermore, the substantive criticisms
and defenses of the governor's proposals provide evidence
that the budgetary process kindled controversy over how the
state's limited resources should be allocated.

In the end, however, the Homestead Relief Act passed
both houses of the Montana legislature by greater than a two
to one margin. Initiative 72, which had not constitutionally
required the 45th legislature to appropriate funds, had been
in the legislative bag after all. The electorate of Montana
now had the tax relief they voted for, and the governor had
received everything he wanted in the 1977-79 biennium
budget.

Nevertheless, the November vote could not be
overfooked. Only those who believe that budgeting is purely
an economic endeavor can minimize the effects that
Initiative 72 had on the legislative budgetary process. Those
who know that budgeting is essentially a political process
recognize that political pressures stemming from the
initiative had decided effects upon the political feasibility of
alternatives available to legislators concerning the funding
of the Homestead Relief Act.
What can be argued (and legislators made this argument)
is that through the inclusion of an external participant, the
governor sought to circumvent the established fiscal process.
In other words, the governor "stacked the deck" in his favor
by creating a scenario in which the executive and legislative
roles assumed new meaning. Initiative 72 serves as an
example of a governor's fundamental advantage in using the
initiative process to secure support for executive proposals.
That advantage is inherent in the governor's role in the state
organization. Any governor who chooses to attempt to
garner support through an initiative campaign possesses all
of the powers of public accessibility available to a chief
executive. This ability to maintain high visibility with the
public affords a governor the opportunity to "sell" an idea to
the electorate by using those official lines of communication.
The legislature has no comparable means within the state
organization to rally public opinion.

II AN EVALUATION
The events leading to the funding of the Homestead Relief
Act serve as an example of the complexities of the state
budgetary process. Moreover, areas of controversy and
concern remain with regard to the effects that those events
will have on future state budgetary processes. The history of
the Homestead Relief Act assumes added importance when
viewed as events which could reoccur. For this reason, it
appears useful to examine those events.
It is obvious that proposed legislation lives or dies upon
the support that sponsors are able to muster. Similarly, it is
apparent that the odds are weighted towards legislation
supported by those who are in a position to exert influence
upon other participants in the process. Along these lines, the
world of budgeting has been described as a drama,
populated by a wide and diverse variety of actors socialized
into roles and utilizing those roles as calculating devices to
simplify their budgetary decisiqn-making processes. This
view has been articulated further in that the roles fit in w,ith
one another and set up a pattern of mutual expectations
among the participants. This concept of roles and
expectations in the budgetary process is applicable in the
case of the Homestead Relief Act, as there were conflicting
interpretations of what constituted legitimate behavior. The
fact that citizen input became directly involved through
Initiative 72 prompted some members of the legislature to
perceive that an unexpected role had been incorrectly and
unfortunately interjected into the budgetary process. To
these members of the 45th legislature, the initiative
represented pressure from outside the customary budgetary
process.

When employed by a governor to gain acceptance of
executive proposals, the initiative process tilts the balance
between executive and legislative power towards the
executive. Through the initiative process a governor can, in
effect, sidestep the legislature by first selling a proposal to the
electorate. Legally the role of the legislature is not shifted.
Nevertheless, a de facto role shift does occur when the
electorate becomes directly involved in policy formulation.
The political pressures upon a legislature to comply with the
electorate's message embodied in an initiative are a
compelling force.

The use of the initiative involved a hybrid form of
democracy, composed of representative democracy and
direct democracy. There are obvious contradictions in the
two. The Homestead Relief Act drew attention to these

It is interesting to speculate whether the Property Tax
Replacement Act might have passed had it not been for the
confrontation with the governor and his budget and
Initiative 72. The same holds true for other items of
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detailed examination of relative values of complex and
technical uses of funds severely strain an electorate's
capability to render sound choices. Incapacity to weigh
adequately specific policy alternatives does not preclude the
electorate's ability to address broad policy issues rationally,
nor the ability to evaluate rationally the actions of elected
representatives in pursuit of those broad policies. In other
words, an electorate can rationally determine ends, but must
delegate authority to devise the specific, complex and
technical means to reach those ends. An electorate, in this
sense, while being unable collectively to critique specific
means, is capable of assessing outcomes of specific policies.

legislation and appropriation during the session. Items
which posed threats to the funding of the governor's relief
plan occupied a position of double jeopardy, in that they
faced gubernatorial
opposition and they could be
interpreted as violating the will of the electorate. The
governor, in two previous sessions, had failed to sell similar
property tax legislation to legislators. Considering those two
previous defeats, the amount of substantive opposition to
the Homestead Relief Act voiced by legislators throughout
the session, and the number of dollar-consuming "pet" bills
introduced by legislators, it is likely that without Initiative 72
the legislative budgetary process would have produced
different fates for the Property Tax Replacement Act and
other items of appropriation and legislation.

Elected representatives weigh the relative values of
specific policy alternatives designed to achieve the broad
policy objectives voiced collectively by the electorate.
Therefore, within the representative system an electorate can
rationally determine if representatives are serving their
interests, while not being capable of determining the merits
of specific means to those ends. Similarly, elected
representatives can assess the broad desires of an electorate,
and thus make specific choices among complex alternatives
designed to achieve those policy objectives.

Implications for Public Budgeting

The precedent set by Governor Judge's successful
employment of the initiative process has increased the
likelihood that future state budgetary decisions will be
similarly affected by direct voter involvement through
initiatives. In addressing the implications of the use of the
initiative process in state fiscal policy making, it is useful to
approach the matter in two ways: (1) the merits of the
initiative process as a means to affect state fiscal policy; and
(2) the impact the initiative process is likely to have on future
state fiscal processes.
Because the biennial budget is, in effect, the "blueprint" by
which the state operates for two years, the means through
which that budget is formed are vitally important. The use of
the initiative process to affect state fiscal decisions poses
potentially detrimental consequences. The perplexing issue
is whether or not the electorate has the expertise or the
information with which to make complex choices between
alternative uses of state funds. As the state's fiscal process
becomes evermore complex, with the Montana 1977-79
biennial budget at nearly $1 billion, can the state continue to
honor the initiative process when that process represents
potential fiscal insolvency? Is there any feasible way to
provide an electorate with the information needed to judge
adequately the merits of alternative uses of funds? The
Homestead Relief Act provides an example of the initiative
process creating political pressures which directly affected
the legislature's control of state funds. Upon what criteria
did the electorate make their decision? Is the value of the
initiative process sufficient to offset the potential costs?

In the case of Initiative 72, Governor Judge presented to
the Montana electorate a skillfully marketed "package".
Any voice of opposition able to tarnish that package
required similarly skillful orchestration. The initiative did
not appear to represent imminent financial danger to the
state. To the contrary, Initiative 72 as presented to the
electorate was an attractive proposition. Certainly the
wording of the proposal on the ballot contributed to the
success of the Homestead Relief Act, for undoubtedly few
taxpayers would choose to vote "against reduction of
owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied residential
property". Without any systematic method of supplying the
electorate with the information upon which to judge the
merits of the Homestead Relief Act relative to alternative
uses of state funds, the opposition to Initiative 72 remained
strictly spontaneous and unorganized.
In contrast, the Budgetary Procedures Ceiling Act of
1976, an initiative proposal on the same ballot as Initiative
72, experienced a considerably greater amount of
opposition. The Budgetary Procedures Ceiling Act sought to
put a ceiling of $375 million on Montana legislative
appropriations for any one biennium, along with a gradual
halt to the state's use of federal funds. If that initiative
proposal had passed, and the ceiling had been interpreted to
apply to all of the funds appropriated by the legislature, the
results could have been chaotic. While it can be argued that
this initiative's failure demonstrates the electorate's basic
awareness and responsibility, it can similarly be argued that
the electorate simply responded to the great amount of
opposition which emanated from across the political
spectrum. The difference in amount of opposition voiced
against Initiative 72 and the Budgetary Procedures Ceiling
Act obviously can be attributed to the nature of the two
initiative proposals. Yet, it is similarly valid to attribute the
lack of organized opposition to Initiative 72 to the fact that

The complexities of contemporary state government
preclude the entire electorate's dealing with relevant fiscal
information upon which to base budgetary decisions:
In a democratic society, the division of resources between the public
and private sectors is roughly determined by the electorate, but because
it is such a complex and time consuming task, the electorate is
chronically ignorant of the costs and benefits of many actual and
potential government policies.

Collectively, the electorate is usually incapable of adequately
weighing specific policy alternatives. Decisions requiring
6

choosing the specific means to achieve policy objectives was
upset. Through an initiative such as the Homestead Relief
Act, the electorate indicates specific policy desires, and the
legislature's contribution is fundamentally altered.

such opposition seemed to represent opposition to the idea
of property tax relief. As discussed previously, while many
legislators shared the Montana electorate's desire for
property tax relief, many legislators opposed the Homestead
Relief Act as a means to reach those ends. Yet, many avoided
taking a firm stand because such a position represented real
political risks.

The implications of Initiative 72 for public budgeting are
obvious. While the initiative process has long been
represented as a bulwark of democracy, the complexities of
contemporary state government operations have raised
legitimate doubt as to the suitability of the initiative as a
means to make state fiscal decisions. The issue involves not
merely a governor's opportunity to increase leverage within
the state organization, but more fundamentally it is a
question of direct citizen involvement in specific policy
choices affecting the fiscal operation of the state. The story
of the Homestead Relief Act suggests that in the
complexities of contemporary state government budgetary
processes, the initiative process is a sacred cow that deserves
to be laid to rest.

Unlike Initiative 72, broad policy objectives should be
delineated by the electorate, and the specific values of
alternative means to reach those objectives should be chosen
by elected representatives in a representative democracy. In
this sense, the criteria for what constitutes the "best" specific
uses of state funds are set by elected representatives.
Although the process of legislative appropriations has been
shown to be grossly inadequate at times, and there is no
guarantee that the best choice will be made by a legislature,
that body is in a better position than the electorate to address
fiscal issues and make specific choices. The "correctness" of
those specific choices, in the final analysis, is determined by
Montana voters who ultimately assess the responsiveness of
those representatives in directing government activities.
Elected representatives can be removed from office through
the electoral process if state voters should judge them to be
unresponsive. Although the state bureaucracy possesses the
expertise to render sound fiscal decisions, the electorate has
no direct electoral means to hold the bureaucracy
accountable for its actions. The legislature's accountability
to the electorate tends to overshadow other deficiencies of
legislative decision-making, and in this sense, the legislature,
rather than the bureaucracy, should engage in the budgetary
process. Without that accountability, the electorate's
influence over governmental decisions would be severely
limited. Therefore, the deficiencies in the electorate's ability
to render sound decisions on specific, complex policy issues,
and the lack of direct means with which to hold the state
bureaucracy accountable for its actions, places the
legislature in the best position to allocate the state's limited
resources.
As the initiative process now stands in Montana state
government, the initiative is inadequate as a means to allow
direct voter involvement in specific fiscal policy formulation,
such as the Homestead Relief Act. Although it is still on the
books, the initiative process is not suitable in cases of specific
policy formulation, and until the time major revisions are
designed to remedy the obvious deficiencies, the initiative
will have no legitimate place in state fiscal decision-making.
Although the initiative process is unsuitable for specific
fiscal policy formulation, the precedent set by Governor
Judge's successful employment of the initiative may dictate
an increasing use of that process for future state fiscal policymaking. It remains to be seen if future Montana governors
will follow suit.

Political Implications

A corrollary issue is the political consequences of actions
taken by participants in the history of the Homestead Relief
Act. If the measure does not redeem the promises made,
those associated with its sponsorship will likely incur
political losses. Similarly, should the measure be received
favorably, the sponsors will benefit politically. It remains to
be seen just how well the relief plan will operate and what its
effect will be on other governmental areas such as the state
public school system.
The manner in which the operation of the plan is received
involves a variety of variables. The governor portrayed the
plan as "the beginning of real property tax relief in
Montana", yet whether that confidence is shared by
Montana property taxpayers upon' receipt of the relatively
small rebate is questionable. It is entirely possible that
Montana taxpayers will perceive that the small rebate does
in fact, as criticized by opponents, offer little as far as
comprehensive, on-going property tax relief. The fact that
the "widespread property tax relief' promised by the
governor could be obtained only if applied for, poses
potentially undesirable consequences for the governor since
the number of actual applications proved to be substantially
less than the number of taxpayers eligible to apply. Should
the Homestead Relief Act prove injurious to counties' ability
to fund public schools, it will be interesting where the blame
is placed- on the Judge administration or the legislature. It
is a fairly safe assumption that the inclusion in the funding
bill of the general-fund surplus limitation provision will tend
to insure against any unforeseen disastrous consequences.
Therefore, there probably will be no disastrous political
consequences for either the legislature or the executive
stemming from major defects in the relief measure.
However, an important consideration is that the Homestead
Relief Act in all probability will not be funded for more than
the two years of the current biennium- possibly only one.
This means the state has not dealt with the problems of the

The Homestead Relief Act represents an instance in which
the initiative process made an impact on the budgetary
process- whether "enlightened" or not. This is unusual in
the United States but is solidly in the populist tradition. The
problem stems from the fact that the legislature's role of
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property tax on an ongoing basis. The Homestead Relief Act
represents a rebate plan that is, and probably always will be,
dependent upon a state general-fund surplus- a dependence
that limits its impact as a permanent aid to property
taxpayers. This analysis means simply that the 1979
Montana legislature will be faced again with the
responsibility of addressing property tax relief or property
tax reform, and with much less than a $50 million generalfund surplus.
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